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Abstract
The basic realist claim is that a mind-independent reality exists.
It should be common sense knowledge to accept this claim, just as any the-
ories that try to deny it soon become inconsistent because reality strikes
back. In spite of this, antirealist philosophies ﬂourish, not only in philoso-
phy but also in the behavioral and cognitive sciences and in information
science. This is highly problematic because it removes the attention from
reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power. Realism
should not be confused with the view that all scientiﬁc claims are true or
with any other kind of naiveté concerning knowledge claims. The opposite
of realism may be termed antirealism, idealism, or nominalism. Although
many people confuse empiricism and positivism with realism, these tradi-
tions are by nature strongly antirealist, which is why a sharp distinction
should be made between empiricism and realism. Empirical research
should not be founded on assumptions about “the given” of observations,
but should recognize the theory-laden nature of observations. Domain
analysis represents an attempt to reintroduce a realist perspective in library
and information science. A realist conception of relevance, information
seeking, information retrieval, and knowledge organization is outlined.
Information systems of all kinds, including research libraries and public
libraries, should be informed by a realist philosophy and a realist informa-
tion science.
Introduction
Several forms of philosophical realism exist, including scholastic real-
ism, transcendental realism, scientiﬁc realism, critical realism, and naïve
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realism. The author of this paper subscribes to a view that may be termed
“pragmatic realism.” This paper does not, however, contain a detailed philo-
sophical defense for this view. It is a preliminary work aiming at contribut-
ing some important problems in information science, which to the author
seem deeply related to philosophical problems, in general, and to problems
related to realism, in particular.
The basic claim of realism is that a mind-independent reality exists: for
examples the mountains existed before mankind, and they exist indepen-
dently of whether or not people believe they exist or whether or what they
think about them. This is a claim about what exists. Technically speaking this
is an ontological or metaphysical claim, and the philosophical position is
termed “metaphysical realism.”1  It is shocking that one has to argue for the
existence of a mind-independent reality. It is even more shocking that anti-
realism seems to dominate the discourse today and that not many philoso-
phers or scientists are defending realism in a really scholarly way. It is also
shocking that antirealism seems to have brought about much confusion in
information science, among other ﬁelds. Richard Boyd (2002) writes:
What requires explanation is why this [scientiﬁc realism] is a philosoph-
ical position rather than just a common sense one. Consider, for exam-
ple, tropical ﬁsh realism—the doctrine that there really are tropical ﬁsh;
that the little books you buy about them at pet stores tend to get it
approximately right about their appearance, behavior, food and tem-
perature requirements, etc.; and that the ﬁsh have these properties
largely independently of our theories about them. That’s a pretty clear
doctrine, but it’s so commonsensical that it doesn’t seem to have any
particular philosophical import. Why is the analogous doctrine about
science a philosophical doctrine? [Electronic version]
Yes, it is indeed difﬁcult to see why philosophical realism is not com-
mon sense and thus the only legitimate philosophical position. However, I
do not understand (accept) Boyd’s tropical ﬁsh example. As a realist, I agree
that tropical ﬁsh exist.2  To consider this example, we have to look at the
philosophical positions that confront the realist ones.
The opposite of realism is today often termed “antirealism” (coined so
by Michael Dummett); in older philosophy the opposite was often termed
“idealism,” while Charles Sanders Peirce argued that realism is the oppo-
site of nominalism. In the Marxist and materialist traditions, the opposing
positions are termed “materialism” and “idealism,” respectively. Although
important differences exist, these oppositions are closely related. They are
all related to the same fundamental claim: The possibility of the existence
of a mind-independent reality. So, the realist/materialist position is that
tropical ﬁsh exist, while the antirealist/idealist/nominalist position would
say that they only exist as ideas, concepts, social constructions or the like,
not as mind-independent entities.
The difﬁculty in understanding the realist position is, in my opinion,
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much worse than Boyd describes it. It is not limited to the understanding
of scientiﬁc knowledge but is deeply involved with our everyday knowledge.
Yes, it is really shocking that well-informed, serious, and hard-working peo-
ple end up denying what seems to be the most obvious and fundamental
lesson of human knowledge. Often this denial is not explicit but implied
by other theoretical views.3  It is a real philosophical ocean to swim in, but
I do hope that this paper will demonstrate that we have no choice. The
problem simply is too important for the development of our ﬁeld.
Is Scientific Knowledge True? (About
Epistemological Realism)
(Scientiﬁc) realism is often associated with the view that science pro-
vides a true or realistic picture of the world. As opposed to a metaphysical
claim, this is an epistemological thesis, a thesis about human knowledge,
not about the world as such. Philosophically this is termed “epistemologi-
cal realism.” In the introduction to his article Boyd (2002) writes:
According to scientiﬁc realists, for example, if you obtain a good con-
temporary chemistry textbook you will have good reason to believe
(because the scientists whose work the book reports had good scien-
tiﬁc evidence for) the (approximate) truth of the claims it contains
about the existence and properties of atoms, molecules, sub-atomic
particles, energy levels, reaction mechanisms, etc. Moreover, you have
good reason to think that such phenomena have the properties attrib-
uted to them in the textbook independently of our theoretical concep-
tions in chemistry. Scientiﬁc realism is thus the common sense (or com-
mon science) conception that, subject to a recognition that scientiﬁc
methods are fallible and that most scientiﬁc knowledge is approximate,
we are justiﬁed in accepting the most secure ﬁndings of scientists “at
face value.”4, 5  [Electronic version]
A lesson of the history of science is, however, that scientiﬁc claims have
at least sometimes been wrong. I ﬁnd it dangerous to identify myself with a
theory that encourages me to a naïve or uncritical view of scientiﬁc claims.
Well, I also believe that a good contemporary chemistry textbook reports a
realistic picture about chemical phenomena. Chemistry is a science with a
relatively high level of consensus, and I am more inclined to believe that a
chemistry book reports the truth, than, say, a book in the social sciences.
In all sciences and ﬁelds of scholarship, however, debates and different
theories and views exist. Often such debates involve ontological views about
what really exists. It is not a fruitful position to presuppose a priori that
knowledge claims are true. This is not so for the scientists themselves, and
this is not so for teachers, librarians, information scientists, journalists, and
others who mediate or intermediate between knowledge producers and
users. The healthy attitude is to regard knowledge claims as just claims, not
as facts. It is also important to differentiate between degrees of substantia-
tion of knowledge claims. Some claims, e.g., mathematical proofs and some
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results of physical experiments, may be extremely well founded.6  The prac-
tical implication of this view for information science has been formulated
by Spang-Hanssen (2001):
Moreover, these terms are not seldom confused with a more or less
obscure use of the word “information” to mean something factual or
real as opposed to representations of such facts; what is found written
in documents—or what is said in a lecture—are according to this view
only disguises or at best surrogates of facts. This more or less vague
conception seems to be the basis of the distinction sometimes made
between “fact retrieval” and “document retrieval.”
This distinction I ﬁnd philosophically unbased; we here touch upon
the fundamental problem of the meaning of meaning and of the na-
ture of signs and symbols. What is more essential to us, this distinction
seems unfortunate in actual documentation work. There will, admit-
tedly, be cases in which a document or information center is set up with
the exclusive function of providing information concerning physical
data, or statistical ﬁgures, or exchange rates of currencies, or stock
market prices. But even in such cases, it applies that neither the per-
son who requests such information nor the person who delivers it
should ignore the reliability of data and forget about the general set-
ting in which the data is acquired. Information about some physical
property of a material is actually incomplete without information about
the precision of the data and about the conditions under which these
data were obtained. Moreover, various investigations of a property have
often led to different results that cannot be compared and evaluated
apart from information about their background. An empirical fact al-
ways has a history and a perhaps not too certain future. This history and
future can be known only through information from particular docu-
ments, i.e., by document retrieval.
The so-called fact retrieval centers seem to me to be just information
centers that keep their information sources—i.e., their documents—
exclusively to themselves. (pp. 128–129)
We may conclude that a certain amount of skepticism is a healthy attitude,
especially for information scientists (this was also the conclusion at which
Patrick Wilson, 1983, arrived). Society provides (and should provide) a spec-
trum of information services that allows fast utilization of research results
as well as critical examination of the knowledge claims in the information
systems. Newspapers, for example, provide fast but rather unsubstantiated
knowledge claims, while historical research provides slow but much better
substantiated knowledge. In this way the substantiation of knowledge claims
is divided among different professions in society. Information scientists
should not subscribe to a kind of realism that just takes scientiﬁc knowledge
claims for granted.7  We should distinguish between qualities of claims, what
kinds of arguments and evidence they are supported by. We should not just
provide “facts” but also data needed to contextualize and evaluate those
“facts.” We should be open to different perspectives and we should be “so-
cially and culturally aware and responsible” (cf. Hjørland, 2003). We should
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not go to the extreme alternative of naïve realism and accept extreme ver-
sions of constructivism and relativism. While Thomas Kuhn emphasized how
our ontologies are implied by our theories and paradigms, he nevertheless
emphasized that we cannot freely invent arbitrary structures: “nature can-
not be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. On the contrary . . .
the history of developed science shows that nature will not indeﬁnitely be
conﬁned in any set which scientists have constructed so far” (Kuhn, 1970,
p. 263). The world provides “resistance” to our conceptualizations in the
form of anomalies, i.e., situations in which it becomes clear that something
is wrong with the structures given to the world by our concepts. In this way
Kuhn’s view may be interpreted as (pragmatic) realism, although he is of-
ten interpreted as antirealist (e.g., Niiniluoto, 1991).
Some Roots of Antirealism in Epistemology
According to Niiniluoto (1991), the roots of scientiﬁc realism go back
to the critical, dynamic, empiricist, fallibilist, and evolutionary epistemolo-
gies of the nineteenth century, such as C. S. Peirce’s pragmatism and
Friedrich Engel’s dialectical materialism. In the twentieth century, the de-
mise of logical positivism was according to Niiniluoto followed in the 1950s
by the rise of scientiﬁc realism,8  but the tide of neo-pragmatism in the 1970s
has made antirealist views fashionable once more.9, 10
Overall, I agree with Niiniluoto’s interpretation. Realism is thus con-
nected with pragmatic and materialist traditions and is opposed by, for
example, logical positivism (and its roots in empiricism). It is remarkable,
however, that pragmatism is both related to realism and to antirealism.
There are internal conﬂicts in pragmatism.11
The development of antirealism is perhaps most clearly demonstrat-
ed by considering the development of empiricism. Most people may think
of science as empirical and true (and thus as a realist endeavor). Howev-
er, one of the strongest forces against realism may come from just empir-
icism. Few people outside the philosophy of science realize that empiricism
and positivism are fundamentally antirealist positions. The development
of empiricism as a school of thought implied still deeper degrees of sub-
jective idealism and solipsism. On the basis of Newton’s demonstration that
white light consists of all the colors in the rainbow, evidently, perception
of color is dependent on our perceptual system and brain—we perceive a
mixture of all colors as being white, though they are in reality not. To deal
with this fact, Locke introduced a distinction between the primary or ob-
jective qualities of things (such as their mass and form) and their second-
ary or subjective qualities (such as color, smell, taste). This was the ﬁrst step
toward subjective idealism. The second step was taken by Bishop Berke-
ley, who pointed to the logical fact that the primary qualities of things also
must be subjective. The only way we can learn about the primary qualities
is through our senses. The nature of our senses must therefore inﬂuence
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what we perceive. In the end, it is metaphysical nonsense to claim that a
reality exists behind our observations. The only logical meaning of the
phrase “to exist” is “to be possible to perceive.” Do our bodies exist? Do
other people have minds? The logical answer is, Only if I can perceive
them. Hume brought this subjectivism still a step further. Concepts such
as “causes,” “laws,” “essences,” and “mechanisms” are not real, but only psy-
chological. If we see a ball hit another ball, it looks like the ﬁrst ball caused
the second ball to move. But an experiment can be made using lights in-
stead of balls. People who experience some speciﬁc patterns in the move-
ment of light spots will believe that one light spot causes another to move.
But this is purely psychological. In reality are causes, thus metaphysical con-
structs with no real function. We should describe our experiences, includ-
ing temporal variations in our experiences. To talk about causes, underly-
ing mechanisms, essential features, etc. is metaphysical and thus should
form no part of the empiricist vocabulary. Empiricism is thus a deeply
antirealist position, although related to naïve realism.
While empiricism represents an attempt to remove metaphysical and
ideological questions from science by sticking strictly to observations, crit-
ics have pointed out that pure observation does not exist, that our obser-
vations are theory-laden. The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912–
1989) maintained that classical empiricism is a myth based on the “doctrine
of the given” (c.f. Vinci, 1999, p. 828). By not considering metaphysical,
theoretical, and ideological questions openly, empiricism tends to hide the
ideological commitments of its adherents. It has been demonstrated that
empiricism does imply a metaphysical view. This way empiricism becomes
just one ideology among others. Its belief in sensory information as “the
given” is a faulty assumption. The deep and consequent claim of this mis-
taken assumption has brought empiricism into a strong antirealist position.
Empiricism is a problematic philosophy, but this does not, of course, im-
ply that empirical research is mistaken. It may imply, however, that empir-
ical research should be based on a realist philosophy.
Many (post)modern epistemologists do not ﬁnd that science should
aim at objectivity. There is a tendency to associate positivist positions and
ideals with attributes such as “hard” and “objective,” whereas ideals from
the humanities and hermeneutics are associated with “softness” and “sub-
jectivity.” This is a wrong and harmful confusion. First, it is important to
realize that subjectivity is not the logical opposite of objectivity:
We shall not dwell at such length on the notion of subjectivity, insofar
as it refers to the opinions, beliefs, and feelings of conviction of this or
that individual. Let us mainly note that this is not in any way the logi-
cal opposite of objectivity. People said to be “reasonable” or “sensible”
will often give their (subjective) agreement to a well-corroborated (ob-
jective) statement such as “when an apple becomes detached from a
tree, it falls down and does not ﬂy towards the stars.” In that sense,
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obviously, any probabilistic statement, insofar as some individual ex-
presses his support for it, can always be said to be subjective. But this
does not exclude a priori its objectivity. An objective law, such as the
law of universal attraction, insofar as I believe it to be “true” can also
be said to be subjective, since it does, in fact, represent my personal
opinion. (Matheron, 1989/1978, pp. 26–27)
Second, objectivity should be an ideal for all epistemologies. Best (1998)
concludes his review of Harding (1998) as follows: “As Harding ably shows,
the politicization and pluralization of knowledge is not necessarily a threat
to (strong) objectivity, but one of its preconditions.” This quotation is im-
portant. It says that what are often regarded as soft, subjective methods are
in reality a precondition for “strong objectivity.” Harding seeks to replace
the “weak objectivity” of the male-dominated scientiﬁc world—a pseudo-
objectivity riddled with value-laden theories, political biases, domineering
interests, commodiﬁed research, and blinkered ethical vision— with the
“strong objectivity” that comes only from a “robust reﬂexivity” attained
through a rigorous self-scrutiny of one’s socioepistemological starting point.
Harding notes that the very concept of “value-free knowledge” is oxymo-
ronic since the goal of being disinterested is an interest in itself, and it al-
lows science to separate fact from value and abrogate responsibility for its
actions. Since “value-free” theories are impossible, Harding argues, one
might as well acknowledge the values that inform one’s research—be it to
make money or to improve the lives of the sick—debate their comparative
validity, and struggle to have science informed by progressive interests.
The roots of antirealism have thus been connected to problematic
epistemological assumptions in, for example, empiricism and postmodern-
ism. The problem is thus to identify those mistaken assumptions and to
correct them. For us in information science and other specialized ﬁelds,
this does not imply the construction of our own philosophy, but to learn
from the best articulated positions and those positions are forms of real-
ism, pragmatism, and activity theory/historical cultural theory. But, of
course, this can only be a postulate in this paper. Much more interdiscipli-
nary work needs to be done in the philosophy of science.
Antirealist Tendencies in the Cognitive Sciences
Antirealism is widespread in psychology, linguistics, artiﬁcial intelli-
gence, and related disciplines. This family of disciplines is often termed “the
cognitive sciences.”12  The antirealism of these disciplines is based on a
representationist theory of perception and is connected with methodolog-
ical individualism, i.e., the tendency to explain cognitive phenomena by
studying individual cognition and to disregard the social, cultural, and his-
torical implications of human cognition.13
In psychology, the Danish psychologist Erik Schultz (1988, pp. 65, 117)
presents the following example:
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Imagine a teller. What is she doing? Why does she now count the mon-
ey? Why does she now speak with that customer? Why does she now turn
to a colleague and give him a piece of paper?
How would different psychological approaches answer these questions?
Psychoanalysis might try to explain the teller’s behavior by her unconscious
conﬂicts, which can be traced to early childhood experiences. Behaviorism
might try to explain it by referring to reactions to stimuli and to learned
behavior. Cognitivism might try to explain her behavior by analyzing what
kind of information processing goes on in her brain, and so on. The “real-
istic” answer might be found in a detailed knowledge about the working
organization of the bank. Leontyev points out that persons are not moti-
vated by their biology but by “the structure of production” (Leontyev, 1981).
Behavioral and cognitive paradigms and sciences may appear to be
rather materialistic and realistic. However, their tendency to disregard
questions of meaning, cognitive implications of cultural-symbolic systems,
and the organization of knowledge in social institutions makes them, in fact,
deeply antirealist. Because of this tendency, those ﬁelds are often strongly
criticized, as, for example, in this quotation:
[Behaviorism is] a degenerating research programme. That is, speciﬁc
theories developed within the programme were continuously refuted
and constantly replaced with weaker, more trivial, and more ad hoc ones;
fundamental notions such as “stimulus” and “reinforcement” became
vaguer and vaguer, until virtually anything could qualify; and awkward
refuting results came to be explained in terms of assumptions which
broke the internal constraints of the research programme itself. In
other words, I want to suggest that the poverty of Behaviourism’s
achievements in helping us to understand behaviour was the result of
its false theoretical assumptions. (Briskman, 1984, p. 110)
Many people think that cognitivism is not better founded, that if you change
a few words the same criticism applies to what is often seen as the succes-
sor of behaviorism. Hamlyn (1995, p. 388) writes that a representationist
view of perception has become the vogue today, particularly among cogni-
tive scientists (and information scientists), who hold that the mind’s work-
ings have to do with mental representations. Many philosophers and sci-
entists have adopted the representationalist view of perception because it
seems obvious. “In the end, the only positive argument for idealism of any
form is to be found in the representative theory of perception, and that
theory is false” (Hamlyn, 1995, p. 388).
From a social semiotic point of view, Paul Thibault criticizes the anti-
realism of cognitivism:
Cognitive science retains the traditional model of the individual at the
same time that it relocates essentially social semiotic patterns in the
“mind” of the individual, so conceived. Cognitive science started out
as a reaction against behaviourism. The metalanguage of cognitive sci-
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entists is founded on notions such as “internal mental representations,”
“mental models,” and “mind as symbolic system.” In actual fact, these
notions really only amount to redescriptions of semantic patterns which
are located in the domain of social meaning-making. Cognitive science
posits an unnecessary level of “individual mind” between the biologi-
cal and social semiotic levels of organization. In so doing, it effectively
de-locates semantic patterns from the texts and social activity-structures
in which these are made and re-locates them in the “mind” of the indi-
vidual. More recently, cognitive scientists have increased their appeals
to the neurophysiological processes in the brain, yet there is no con-
vincing evidence that semantics is directly tied to or caused by such
processes [see Maze, 1991, pp. 171–172, for a critique]. Neurophysio-
logical and other bodily processes participate directly in social semio-
sis; they do not cause it, just as the latter is not explanatorily reducible
to the former [Bhaskar, 1979, pp. 124–128; Prodi, 1977]. (Thibault,
1993)
While the cognitive view assumes that “in the beginning there is the indi-
vidual” and focuses on individuals’ cognitions, the sociocognitive and do-
main analytic view assumes that “in the beginning there is a community”
as well as a body of more or less substantiated knowledge claims; its distin-
guishing charge is to locate interactional processes in their social structur-
al context as well as in their theoretical-substantial context. The relation-
ship with realism is that unless the rootedness of cognition (the mind) in
social structure and speciﬁc content is recognized, causal power is falsely
accorded to cognition or mind. Cognitive scientists may recognize that
cognition reﬂects experience, but experience does not enter theoretical
formulations or research designs; for sociocognitivism, on the other hand,
the sociological and philosophical perspectives are central: how experience
is organized is central to both theory and research. The implication for
cognitive views both in psychology and in information science may well be
that they represent
a degenerating research programme. That is, speciﬁc theories devel-
oped within the programme were continuously refuted and constant-
ly replaced with weaker, more trivial, and more ad hoc ones; fundamen-
tal notions such as “information,” “mental models,” and “interactivity”14
became vaguer and vaguer, until virtually anything could qualify; and
awkward refuting results came to be explained in terms of assumptions
which broke the internal constraints of the research programme itself.
In other words, I want to suggest that the poverty of Cognitivism’s
achievements in helping us to understand information behavior and
information phenomena was the result of its false theoretical assump-
tions. (Modiﬁed version of Briskman, op. cit.)
These parallels between cognitive views in psychology and in library and
information science (LIS) are examined further next.
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Realism and Antirealism in LIS
Antirealism is widespread in LIS, not as an explicit position but as an
underlying tendency in most research. We encounter, for example, this
tendency in research on relevance and on knowledge organization (KO)
and in the assumptions underlying much research in information seeking
and information retrieval (IR).
The nature of this antirealism can be illustrated by an example. Our
knowledge of reality is often produced by specialists in society.15  Our geo-
graphical knowledge is, for example, represented by maps, which are pro-
duced by geographers; our medical knowledge is often produced by bio-
medical researchers and our zoological knowledge by zoologists, etc.
Whether Copenhagen is a part of Sweden or not should not be decided by
the users of an information system but rather should be decided by con-
sulting a cognitive authority in geography. Whether or not a certain sub-
stance is relevant as a cure for cancer is ultimately decided in medical re-
search, not by asking patients or users of medical services.16  The
validity—and thus the relevance—of a document claiming that a certain
substance is relevant as a cure for cancer is also ultimately decided in med-
ical research, not by asking users of information services.17, 18  Thus we have
a central realist claim: A given document may be relevant to a given pur-
pose, whether or not the user believes this to be so.19
Both a reality and beliefs about that reality exist. In information science,
most research activities have in recent decades been directed toward user
preferences and attitudes, not toward the basis for the knowledge claims
represented in information systems. Most relevance research seems to as-
sume that the relevance of given kinds of information can be established
by studying the relevance criteria of the users. This is clearly an idealist
position, although probably nobody would like to admit that. This is not
to say that one should always trust experts—they may have their own inter-
ests or views.20  It is rather to claim that relevance is not a subjective phe-
nomenon but rather an objective one. To be engaged in how to identify
what is relevant is to be engaged in scientiﬁc arguments, ultimately in epis-
temology (for a more detailed discussion of the realist position in relevance
research, see Hjørland, 2000a and Hjørland & Sejer Christensen, 2002).
The ﬁeld of information-seeking behavior has in a similar way been
dominated by antirealist tendencies. When people seek information, they
have given systems of information resources with given potentialities at
their disposal.21  All available knowledge may turn out to be useless in
relation to a given problem, or relevant knowledge may be misjudged.
What users know about these given resources and potentialities, how they
evaluate them, and how they utilize them are different matters compared
with their objective possibilities. Users’ information behavior should be
interpreted on the basis of how they utilize these objective possibilities.
This is the realist perspective on information behavior, while the antire-
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alist or idealist perspective is to study the information-seeking behavior
of users while neglecting to relate this behavior to the objective possibil-
ities. While information science has largely neglected to study informa-
tion behavior from this realist perspective, it has removed the attention
from reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power (for
a more detailed discussion of the realist position in information-seeking
research, see Hjørland, 2000b).
IR has also traditionally been antirealist. This is partly a consequence
of the antirealist view of relevance, which understands relevance as users’
criteria of relevance, not as relevance in an objective sense. Partly it is a
consequence of views related to users’ query formulations and to the sys-
tem of information resources. From a realist position the users’ questions
and terminology may be more or less optimal in relation to given goals. They
are not the given point of departure from which all IR theory must start.
The users’ questions and terminology reﬂect their subjective view, not nec-
essarily insight in the subject matter. People subscribing to different theo-
ries or “paradigms” see things differently and formulate different questions.
A question is not a thing that should be regarded as empirically “given,”
but a thing that must be interpreted in relation to accumulated human
knowledge on the issue.
Also, the system of information resources is not something divided from
the user in a dualistic way. The user and the system are more or less parts
of, and inﬂuenced by, the same theoretical, conceptual, and linguistic en-
vironments. I would say that different semantic distances are at play. The
information system may or may not contain relevant information. The us-
er’s expectations about what information exists, where it exists, and what
terms have been used to describe it may be more or less realistic. Existing
documents have given informative potentialities (Hjørland, 1992). Any
theory of IR has to relate to the relative degree of realism in users’ expec-
tations, to the users’ subject knowledge, and to the semantic distances be-
tween queries and documents: the basic elements in a realist theory of IR.
Historical research methods, among others, may provide some help. Pri-
mary information sources are objectively more reliable compared to sec-
ondhand information sources. This is well known and taught in courses
about historical source criticism. People learn this when they study history
at a university. Primary recordings of, for example, parliamentary debates
are more reliable than newspaper quotes of those debates. There are giv-
en qualities in information sources, whether or not the users realize this.
Research libraries and information centers should facilitate the use of such
primary information sources when this is appropriate, and the criteria for
their collection and organization of information resources cannot be based
on user surveys or similar methods based on antirealist philosophy. It is
shocking that such elementary considerations seem to be almost totally
absent from theories of IR and information seeking. Hjørland (1998) and
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Hjørland and Kyllesbech Nielsen (2001) provide more information about
a realist approach to IR.
The ﬁeld of KO in LIS has generally developed from a realist to an
antirealist position during the twentieth century. Around 1900, Charles A.
Cutter, W. C. Berwick Sayers, and Ernest Cushington Richardson strongly
emphasized that the classiﬁcation of books in libraries is basically informed
by the organization of knowledge, which is represented in (new) docu-
ments. The origin of the phrase “knowledge organization” in LIS is clearly
related to their works, according to which book classiﬁcation is basically KO
and the knowledge needed to classify books comes from knowledge pro-
duction, of which the books are the tangible expression. Cutter, for exam-
ple, wrote:
I believe . . . that the maker of a scheme for book arrangement is the
most likely to produce a work of permanent value, if he keeps always
before his mind a classiﬁcation of knowledge. (Cutter, 1888)22
Sayers expressed it in the following way:
A book classiﬁcation must hold the minuteness of the knowledge
classiﬁcation as an ideal to which it must approximate as nearly as pos-
sible (p. 34). It must be clearly borne in mind, however, that the classiﬁ-
cation of knowledge should be the basis of the classiﬁcation of books;
that the latter obeys in general the same laws, follows the same se-
quence. (Sayers, 1915, p. 31).
And Richardson said:
In general the closer a classiﬁcation can get to the true order of the
sciences and the closer it can keep to it, the better the system will be
and the longer it will last. (Richardson, 1964/1930, p. 33)
These quotations may sound very “positivist” compared with more recent
views of science, but in my opinion they are more realistic than later views.
Although they may underplay the question of how to cope with different sci-
entiﬁc theories or “paradigms” in KO, they knew that this problem existed.
They also knew that there were no shortcuts. They did not confuse reality
with users’ beliefs or preferences. During the twentieth century, however,
this view was sadly weakened. Especially user-oriented and cognitive views
represent a strong idealist tendency by neglecting that principles of KO are
based on knowledge as contained in the documents to be organized.
Today, library students in Denmark read a textbook that interprets the
above mentioned founders of KO in LIS in the following way:
. . . today most philosophers would argue against them [Cutter, Sayers,
and Richardson]. The relativist and pragmatic trend has caused that
most people today would argue that knowledge is subjective and that dif-
ferent people in different times would perceive the world differently. The
aim of bibliographical classiﬁcation is thus to a large degree founded
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in some practical considerations concerning the construction of the sys-
tem, and not necessarily on particular philosophical movements.
(Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, & Mai, 1998, p. 18; my translation)
Although the quoted compendium is otherwise excellent, this speciﬁc quo-
tation is an example of a problematic antirealist position. The important
thing in this conclusion is that it connects the basis of KO to the problem
of epistemology in general and realism in particular. This underlines the
needs for epistemological studies within LIS and KO. Cutter, Sayers, and
Richardson knew and considered the problems related to realism versus
idealism. This is not new but has been neglected for a long time. The ques-
tion is, What kind of implications should be drawn from “relativist, prag-
matist, and subjectivist views”? 23  Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, and Mai
(1998) draw the conclusion that because scientiﬁc knowledge is subjective,
we should not consider it, apparently implying that the librarian’s own
common sense should form the basis of systems of KO. However, I do not
agree with this conclusion. The domain analytic view that I have proposed
(Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995; Hjørland, 2002) does not disregard the
scientiﬁc view. In this respect it may be more closely related to Cutter, Say-
ers, and Richardson than it is to the above-cited view, not to mention “user-
oriented” and “cognitive” views. Domain analysis emphasizes, however, that
scientiﬁc claims should not be confused with facts. It is important to con-
sider different views and to remain skeptical toward knowledge claims and
toward social and cultural biases (see Hjørland, 2003). LIS cannot ignore
science and scholarship. It does not have its own private alternative (nor
do the users). This is not to say that one should uncritically accept scien-
tiﬁc knowledge claims. In fact, the most important function of libraries and
information systems is to enable critical users to question established knowl-
edge and investigate alternative views.
I ﬁnd a connection between antirealist trends in IS, lack of domain-
speciﬁc knowledge, and the critique that David Bade raises concerning KO
in databases:
Virtually all of the literature on cataloging and on database quality is
concerned with technologies or methods and standards. Acknowledge-
ment that cataloging is an intellectual activity that requires an ability
to understand what an item is about, and prior to that, an ability to read
the speciﬁc language of the text, is so rare as to be disturbing. Howev-
er librarians may have thought in the past, in the present climate of
technological possibilities and the excitement they generate, librarians
increasingly see themselves as information scientists, and their work as
information handling, brokering, and management. What must not be
forgotten is that information always has a speciﬁc content. Catalogers,
bibliographers, and reference librarians in fact work not with abstract
information devoid of content, but with autopoiesis, prosopography,
logotherapy, Rechtsextremismus, amparo, Ujamaa, sultawiyya, Babad Bule-
leng, Yuan chao pi shih, arianism, Brownian motion, Empﬁndungslosigkeit,
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chocolate chip cookies, and anti-semitism. Information science knows
nothing of these matters, in any language. (Bade, 2002, p. 18, empha-
ses in original)
This connection is related to the neglect of subject knowledge in LIS. The
founders of KO recognized this need. Richardson/Bliss, for example, wrote:
“Again from the standpoint of the higher education of librarians, the
teaching of systems of classiﬁcation . . . would be perhaps better con-
ducted by including courses in the systematic encyclopedia and meth-
odology of all the sciences, that is to say, outlines which try to summa-
rize the most recent results in the relation to one another in which they
are now studied together. . . .” (Ernest Cushing Richardson, quoted
from Bliss, 1935, p. 2)
This suggestion was in practice followed in schools of LIS. The Royal School
of Library and Information Science in Denmark, for example, actually had
departments for science and technology, social sciences, and humanities
teaching subjects such as special bibliography, subject literature, subject
encyclopedism, and the philosophy and communication of subject knowl-
edge. These departments were gradually fusioned, and the last trace of them
disappeared from the organizational structure of the school in February
1999. Students still have to take courses in KO and information seeking in
speciﬁc domains, however, and the Domain Analytic approach to informa-
tion science (especially Hjørland, 2002) was developed as a theoretical
frame of reference of IS to cope with the core problem of how to tackle
subject knowledge in the education of information specialists.
In this section, I have made a connection between interdisciplinarity
and realism. The main thought is that if a piece of research is reﬂecting a
reality, then this will be conﬁrmed by other researchers (and practitioners),
and knowledge will tend to grow in a cumulative way. On the other hand,
if a ﬁeld of research is isolated, it might well be an indication that the ﬁeld
is just construing some kind of pseudo-knowledge based on, for example,
a professional ideology. Eugene Garﬁeld wondered that psychiatry journals
were very rarely cited by psychology journals, and he opined:
I would not go so far as to say that psychologists and behavioral scien-
tists work in a closed tower, but very obviously they seem not to look
too much at the research world elsewhere. If they do, they seem not to
have found much that is helpful. If they have, they aren’t admitting the
fact in their citations. (Garﬁeld, 1975, p. 9)
In this way, I believe, there are connections between interdisciplinary ex-
change and realist philosophy.24  Some ﬁelds like psychology and LIS may
isolate themselves too much. In seeking to avoid the hard work of coordi-
nating their research efforts and also to avoid criticism of their basic assump-
tions, such ﬁelds may to some degree construe “knowledge” in a manner
that fails to cumulate satisfactorily.25  Some disciplines may try to “become
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independent” by neglecting knowledge produced by other disciplines and
thereby fail to confront their own knowledge claims with more generally
accepted claims.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued why I consider philosophical realism to be
important to information science. My attitude has been that in ﬁelds of
knowledge such as information science and cognitive science there may
exist theoretical errors, which can be corrected. A philosophy is not some-
thing that you just choose, it is something you work out or construe to solve
problems related to your ﬁeld of study and your profession. I should has-
ten to add, however, that research carried out from antirealistic perspec-
tives will not always be fruitless. Some interesting research today in IS, for
example, is done under the banner of social constructivism. Pragmatic re-
alism and social constructivism share the view of the importance of socio-
historical perspectives as an alternative to epistemological individualism. In
the end, however, it is important to base a discipline on a proper philosoph-
ical framework.
Notes
1. Closely related to the problem of realism is the problem of objectivity and subjectivity
because objectivity implies that a representation is in accordance with its object, while
subjectivity implies that it is in accordance with the subject that has produced it. Objectiv-
ity should not be confused with intersubjectivity. Indexing, for example, is not necessarily
objective, even if all indexers agree. They may be consistently wrong. Measurement of
indexing consistency is a typical empiricist/positivist strategy. If all members of a profes-
sion share the same fundamental ideas, their knowledge is intersubjective, but not neces-
sarily objective. Social constructivists, for example, may be able to demonstrate that such
knowledge just represents a dominating ideology. An alternative to the positivist measure-
ment of indexing consistency could thus be to unravel how different theories/epistemo-
logical views imply different kinds of indexing. An underlying assumption in this approach
might be that objectivity is more likely to occur if the indexer has a high degree of reﬂec-
tivity based on knowledge of different views. Objectivity is thus connected with realism,
while subjectivity may or may not be connected with antirealism (see more about subjec-
tivity later in this article).
2. Although I would add that ﬁsh can be classiﬁed in different ways and that the concept of
tropical ﬁsh may be a problematic one in some situations—or perhaps in all. “It is charac-
teristic of many antirealists to take semantic issues pertaining to language as primary,
whereas realists often give priority to ontology and view semantic theses as derivative of,
or motivated by, ontological positions” (Mäki, 2001, p. 12818).
3. Boyd is, however, correct in stating that kinds of realism are difﬁcult to identify as clearly
demarcated philosophical doctrines. As Niiniluoto (1991, p. 762) writes, “the ontological
position of scientiﬁc realism is opposed to all forms of subjective idealism (such as solip-
sism and phenomenalism). On the other hand, the minimal thesis that at least part of reality
is independent of human minds can be combined with reductionist materialism or phys-
icalism (Smart, Armstrong), emergent materialism (Engels, Popper, Bunge), mind-body
dualism, or even objective idealism (Peirce, Bohm). It is compatible with nominalism (Sell-
ars) as well as ‘scholastic’ realism about universals (Peirce, Armstrong), or with object
ontology as well as process (Popper) or system ontology (Bunge). Further, it may, or may
not assert the reality of potencies (Harré).”
4. Boyd’s demand that it should be a good textbook and not just a typical textbook or even
any textbook is perhaps a curious reservation because it may move discussions about sci-
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entiﬁc realism to a discussion about which books are representing a realist picture of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge. Also his remark “you have good reason to think that such phenomena
have the properties attributed to them in the textbook independently of our theoretical
conceptions in chemistry” is strange, because the theoretical conceptions in chemistry
cannot be independent of the knowledge claims in chemistry. The theoretical conceptions
together with the speciﬁc knowledge claim represent a whole, although we may have dif-
ferent interpretations of some data. The question is, Does this whole represent a mind-
independent reality or just an idea, a theory, a view, or a mental, or social construction?
(e.g., a masculine construct). This is again related to the question, Do, for example, dif-
ferent cultures tend to develop different kinds of chemistry? If they do not, we may fur-
ther ask if this is the case because there is only one possible way of developing chemistry
or because there is a kind of cultural hegemony that suppresses possible alternatives?
5. “Realist theses about possible reference and possible truth in scientiﬁc theories are often
complemented with claims about actual properties of actual science. One such claim—
made by Richard Boyd, Michael Devitt, and others—is that the theoretical terms of most
current (or the best of ‘mature’) scientiﬁc theories typically refer and that their lawlike
statements are at least approximately true. Another related claim is the convergence the-
sis: as science develops, its theories get progressively closer to the truth. Both of these are
empirical claims about actual science and should not be made part of the concept of sci-
entiﬁc realism. Their truth is dependent on contingent matters such as the institutional
structure and other resources of scientiﬁc research as these happen to be in any given
society and time period.” (Mäki, 2001, p. 12818).
6. In general, it is the scientists’ job to produce trustable knowledge claims. The political
sphere and the rest of society turn to scientists and to scholars to obtain knowledge they
can rely on. To make their claims reliable, scientists follow certain standards, e.g., to com-
municate the basis of their claims, to apply the most respected research methods, to allow
criticism, to maintain an open and transparent communication system, and to be inde-
pendent of direct economic, moral, or political interests. No such norms can, however,
guarantee the truth of scientiﬁc claims.
7. Indeed, that strong antirealist trends ﬂourish in many ﬁelds of science and scholarship is
in itself an indication that huge amounts of knowledge claims are wrong, or at least founded
on problematic assumptions.
8. Niiniluoto (1991) mentions Karl Popper, J. J. C. Smart, Wilfrid Sellars, David Bohm, Hi-
lary Putnam, Mario Bunge, and Rom Harré as scientiﬁc realists.
9. Niiniluoto mentions Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Larry Laudan, Nelson Goodman,
Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Bas van Fraassen as antirealists.
10. The most recent trends in realism have been brought forward under the labels “critical
realism” (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979, & 1989; Collier, 1998; Creaven, 2000), which also has been
applied to information systems research (Dobson, 2001a and 2001b) and “activity theory”
(Leontyev, 1981) and its application in library and information science (LIS) (Spasser,
2002) and in various works by Hjørland.
11. Rorty, for example, is clearly antirealist. According to Laudan (1977, 1996), however, Rorty
is not even regarded as a pragmaticist.
12. Earlier, under the inﬂuence of another theoretical trend, they were often termed “the
behavioral sciences.”
13. Recently more social approaches have been introduced in the behavioral and cognitive
sciences; most noteworthy is social constructionism. As discussed in Nightingale and Crom-
by (1999), such approaches also may be antirealist. A social perspective might thus be a
necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, attribute for realist theories.
14. Aarseth (2003) discusses the meaning of three core terms in electronic media: interactiv-
ity, hypertext, and virtuality. He writes: “Perhaps the most important reason for using these
distinctive terms is to create an enthusiasm (‘Hype’) that will make a difference eventual-
ly where no difference of importance yet exists. Maybe this is the only way to innovate, to
bring about something new” (p. 418).
15. Social constructivists and other idealists may argue that specialists do not produce knowl-
edge of reality, but that they construct or claim a reality. It is still, however, the question of
epistemology to determine if one kind of construction is as good as another. I think that
Feyerabend’s position of methodological anarchism is untenable. In most cases, experts
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are simply in a better position to produce valid knowledge. There may be exceptions, e.g.,
connected to ideological bias, but such exceptions cannot in my opinion make the gener-
al rule invalid. My guess is that even people who are most critical of scientists make use of
their ﬁndings, such as computers and medical treatments. In this way they indirectly
conﬁrm the principle of expertise in knowledge production. If somebody would defend
the view that the opinions of experts are not generally better founded than those of lay
people, this would have serious implications. Among those implications would be that we
have to give up all education and research because people are just as well-informed with-
out these processes. This is obviously absurd.
16. It is always legitimate to be skeptical about a knowledge claim. This will lead into a discus-
sion about the basis for that claim and ultimately to epistemological discussions. Such dis-
cussions are, by principle, part of the discourse on a given subject. There is no privileged
or neutral platform that can substitute for arguments.
17. The experts may, of course, be wrong, as we have already discussed. This is no argument,
however, why nonexperts should be right. They might be. The only way to settle disputes
between different views is to examine the basis for the arguments raised in favor of them,
as this is done in, for example, courts, scientiﬁc experiments, and epistemological argu-
ments. To ﬁnd the relevance criteria by empirical studies of users and their needs or by
considering experimental studies in cognitive science is simply misplaced.
18. In some domains, e.g., rock music, there may be a lack of researchers. Musicology seems
to neglect nonclassical music. In such cases, the users may be “experts,” at least until this
ﬁeld is properly represented in musicology. In other ﬁelds, such as child psychology, ex-
perienced mothers may have adequate competencies for which a degree in developmen-
tal psychology cannot be a substitute. This last example is related to different epistemolo-
gies, i.e., to different views of how to obtain knowledge. Developmental psychology has
mainly been dominated by a “positivist” epistemology, while other epistemologies give a
higher status to the kind of experiences that motherhood represents. In both cases, the
realist view applies: A given document may or may not be relevant to a given purpose,
whether or not the user believes this to be so.
19. Of course, a document is not relevant in a situation if the user cannot understand it. In
higher education, it is normally attempted to provide students with the knowledge neces-
sary to study the documents that are deemed to be relevant. In the sciences, one learns
mathematics and in theology one learns Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. The underlying phi-
losophy is that the relevant texts presuppose these kinds of learning. Again, different opin-
ions may exist. Different views of what is relevant may exist as different “paradigms” in all
subjects.
20. This was also emphasized by the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey, who saw one way to
tackle this by the enlightening of people.
21. The users confront in principle a given system of information resources. However, if they
are researchers, they may of course also contribute to the system of information resources.
Many research activities may be motivated by dissatisfaction with given resources.
22. This quotation is cited from Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, and Mai (1998, p. 18). I have
been unable to identify or verify it.
23. It is wrong, however, to claim that Cutter, Sayers, and Richardson did not consider the
practical considerations of systems of KO. They explicitly stated that this was their most
important consideration. Richardson (1964, p. v) stated: “It seems to be worth repeating,
therefore, that the attitude of this book is ‘that in the case of conﬂict the practical always
prevails over the theoretical’.”
24. Although I claim that there exists a mind-independent reality, I do not claim that our
knowledge is or can be mind-independent. Although our knowledge is subjective, it may,
however, also be objective, in accordance with its object, which is always an object for some-
body. For the pragmatist, the criterion for the truth of a claim is connected to the conse-
quences for action and the building of coherent knowledge. This is opposed to a dualistic
view in which the mind is seen as separated from a reality and having knowledge that cor-
responds more or less with that reality.
25. I am aware, of course, that other factors are also at play. Isolated ﬁelds may be isolated for
other reasons, and even seemingly ﬂowering ﬁelds may be based on problematic assump-
tions. As discussed in the philosophy of science it is difﬁcult to decide which research pro-
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grams are fruitful and which turn out to be degenerated. The history of science brings the
lesson that it often takes a very long time before it can be decided whether a research pro-
gram is fruitful or turns out to be a deadend, and even then ideas once given up may later
be positively evaluated and reintroduced.
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